Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Wang RW[*]1; He JZ1,2; Wang YQ1,2; Shi L1,3; Li YT[*]1,2 |
| 刊名 | SCIENCE CHINA-LIFE SCIENCES
 |
| 出版日期 | 2010 |
| 卷号 | 53期号:8页码:1041-1046 |
| 关键词 | asymmetric cooperation mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Hawk-Dove game evolutionarily stable strategy |
| 通讯作者 | ruiwukiz@hotmail.com ; liyaotang@ynu.edu.cn |
| 合作状况 | 其它 |
| 英文摘要 | Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk-Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction. |
| 收录类别 | SCI |
| 资助信息 | This work was supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant No. 2007CB411600), the National Natural Sci- ence Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 30670272, 30770500, 10961027 and 10761010), the Yunnan Natural Science Foundation (Grant No. 2009CD104), the State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolu- tion and the West Light Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 源URL | [http://159.226.149.26:8080/handle/152453/10453]  |
| 专题 | 昆明动物研究所_实验与理论生态学 昆明动物研究所_遗传资源与进化国家重点实验室 |
| 作者单位 | 1.State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming 650223, China 2.School of Mathematics and Statistics, Yunnan University, Kunming 650091, China 3.Statistics and Mathematics College, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wang RW[*],He JZ,Wang YQ,et al. Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation[J]. SCIENCE CHINA-LIFE SCIENCES,2010,53(8):1041-1046. |
| APA | Wang RW[*],He JZ,Wang YQ,Shi L,&Li YT[*].(2010).Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation.SCIENCE CHINA-LIFE SCIENCES,53(8),1041-1046. |
| MLA | Wang RW[*],et al."Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation".SCIENCE CHINA-LIFE SCIENCES 53.8(2010):1041-1046. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：昆明动物研究所
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