Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Obnoxious Facility Location on a Line
文献类型：会议论文
| 作者 | Deshi Ye; Lili Mei; Yong Zhang |
| 出版日期 | 2015 |
| 会议名称 | COCOON 2015 The 21th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference |
| 会议地点 | Beijing, China |
| 英文摘要 | In the problem of obnoxious facility location, an obnoxious facility is located in an area. To maximize the social welfare, e.g., the sum of distances from all the agents to the facility, we have to get the true locations of each agent. However, each agent may misreport his/her location to stay far away from the obnoxious facility. In this paper, we design strategy-proof mechanisms on locating an obnoxious facility on a real line. Two objective functions, i.e., maximizing the sum of squares of distances (maxSOS) and maximizing the sum of distances (maxSum), have been considered. For maxSOS, a randomized strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio 5/3 is given, meanwhile the lower bound is proved to be at least 1.042. The lower bound of any randomized strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. maxSum is proved to be 1.077. Moreover, an extended model that each agent controls multiple locations is considered. For this model, we investigate deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. maxSum and maxSOS objectives, respectively. The deterministic mechanisms are shown to be tight for both objectives. |
| 收录类别 | EI |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.siat.ac.cn:8080/handle/172644/6973]  |
| 专题 | 深圳先进技术研究院_数字所 |
| 作者单位 | 2015 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Deshi Ye,Lili Mei,Yong Zhang. Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Obnoxious Facility Location on a Line[C]. 见:COCOON 2015 The 21th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference. Beijing, China. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：深圳先进技术研究院
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