中国科学院机构知识库网格
Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments

文献类型:期刊论文

作者Wang Z1,2; Jusup M[*]3; Moreno Y8,9,10; Kurths J11,12,13; Wang RW[*]4,5; Shi L[*]6; Iwasa Y7
刊名Science Advances
出版日期2017
卷号3期号:X页码:e1601444
关键词Evolutionary Game Theory Prisoner’s Dilemma defection human behavior punishment reciprocity
其他题名lshi@ynufe.edu.cn;wangrw@mail.kiz.ac.cn;mjusup@gmail.com
英文摘要One of the most elusive scientific challenges for over 150 years has been to explain why cooperation survives despite being a seemingly inferior strategy from an evolutionary point of view. Over the years, various theoretical scenarios aimed at solving the evolutionary puzzle of cooperation have been proposed, eventually identifying several cooperation-promoting mechanisms: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. We report the results of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma experiments with anonymous and onymous pairwise interactions among individuals. We find that onymity significantly increases the frequency of cooperation and the median payoff per round relative to anonymity. Furthermore, we also show that the correlation between players' ranks and the usage of strategies (cooperation, defection, or punishment) underwent a fundamental shift, whereby more prosocial actions are rewarded with a better ranking under onymity. Our findings prove that reducing anonymity is a valid promoter of cooperation, leading to higher payoffs for cooperators and thus suppressing an incentive-anonymity-that would ultimately favor defection.
收录类别SCI
资助信息We appreciate the support from National Natural Science Foundation of China (grants nos. 11671348, 31170408, 31270433, 31300318, and 71161020), the National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars (grant no. 31325005), National Science Foundation of China–Yunnan Joint Fund (grant no. U1302267), the West Light Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Special Fund for the Excellent Youth of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (grant no. KSCX2-EW-Q-9), the Japan Science and Technology Agency (Program to Disseminate Tenure Tracking System), Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grant-in- Aid for General Scientific Research (B) (grant no. 24370011), and the National key research and development program (grant no. 2016YFB0800602).
语种英语
源URL[http://159.226.149.26:8080/handle/152453/11070]  
专题昆明动物研究所_遗传资源与进化国家重点实验室
昆明动物研究所_实验与理论生态学
作者单位1.Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Poly- technical University, Xi’an 710072, China
2.Interdisciplinary Graduate School of En- gineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
3.Research Center of Mathematics for Social Creativity, Hokkaido University, Sapporo 060-0812, Japan
4.Department of Physics, Humboldt University, 12489 Berlin, Germany
5.Institute for Complex Systems and Mathematical Biology, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 3UE, U.K
6.Center for Ecology and Environmental Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical Uni- versity, Xi’an 710072, China
7.State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evo- lution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Kunming 650223, China
8.School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
9.Faculty of Science, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 819-0395, Japan
10.Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Wang Z,Jusup M[*],Moreno Y,et al. Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments[J]. Science Advances,2017,3(X):e1601444.
APA Wang Z.,Jusup M[*].,Moreno Y.,Kurths J.,Wang RW[*].,...&Iwasa Y.(2017).Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments.Science Advances,3(X),e1601444.
MLA Wang Z,et al."Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments".Science Advances 3.X(2017):e1601444.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:昆明动物研究所

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