Leadership Selection Punishment Salience and Cooperation
文献类型:会议论文
作者 | Li, YM (Li, Yan-mei)1; Chao, M (Chao, Miao)1,2 |
出版日期 | 2013 |
会议日期 | DEC 10-13, 2013 |
会议地点 | Bangkok, THAILAND |
期号 | 不详 |
页码 | 150-153 |
国家 | THAILAND |
英文摘要 | Power, punishment, and leadership selection influence cooperation. In this research, we test the hypothesis that salient punishment, rather than non-salient punishment, can improve the cooperation of the powerholders selected through exams (e.g., civil servants) and that punishment, whether salient or non-salient, can improve the cooperation of the powerless. Results of the experiment that used the commons dilemma provide evidence for this hypothesis and are discussed in terms of leadership selection, punishment salience, and further implications for corruption prevention. |
产权排序 | 1 |
会议录 | International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management IEEM
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语种 | 英语 |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000395631500031 |
源URL | [http://ir.psych.ac.cn/handle/311026/26346] ![]() |
专题 | 心理研究所_中国科学院行为科学重点实验室 |
作者单位 | 1.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Psychol, Key Lab Behav Sci, 16 Lincui Rd, Beijing 2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing, Peoples R China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Li, YM ,Chao, M . Leadership Selection Punishment Salience and Cooperation[C]. 见:. Bangkok, THAILAND. DEC 10-13, 2013. |
入库方式: OAI收割
来源:心理研究所
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