中国科学院机构知识库网格
Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
Leadership Selection Punishment Salience and Cooperation

文献类型:会议论文

作者Li, YM (Li, Yan-mei)1; Chao, M (Chao, Miao)1,2
出版日期2013
会议日期DEC 10-13, 2013
会议地点Bangkok, THAILAND
期号不详
页码150-153
国家THAILAND
英文摘要

    Power, punishment, and leadership selection influence cooperation. In this research, we test the hypothesis that salient punishment, rather than non-salient punishment, can improve the cooperation of the powerholders selected through exams (e.g., civil servants) and that punishment, whether salient or non-salient, can improve the cooperation of the powerless. Results of the experiment that used the commons dilemma provide evidence for this hypothesis and are discussed in terms of leadership selection, punishment salience, and further implications for corruption prevention.

产权排序1
会议录International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management IEEM
语种英语
WOS记录号WOS:000395631500031
源URL[http://ir.psych.ac.cn/handle/311026/26346]  
专题心理研究所_中国科学院行为科学重点实验室
作者单位1.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Psychol, Key Lab Behav Sci, 16 Lincui Rd, Beijing
2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Li, YM ,Chao, M . Leadership Selection Punishment Salience and Cooperation[C]. 见:. Bangkok, THAILAND. DEC 10-13, 2013.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:心理研究所

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