polar differential power attacks and evaluation
文献类型:期刊论文
作者 | Tang Ming ; Qiu ZhenLong ; Gao Si ; Yi Mu ; Liu ShuBo ; Zhang HuanGuo ; Jin YingZhen |
刊名 | SCIENCE CHINA-INFORMATION SCIENCES
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出版日期 | 2012 |
卷号 | 55期号:7页码:1588-1604 |
关键词 | computer security differential power attack side channel attack |
ISSN号 | 1674-733X |
中文摘要 | Side channel attacks (SCAs) on security software and hardware have become major concerns on computer and system security. The existing SCAs generally require the knowledge of the corresponding cryptographic algorithm and implementation adopted in the target; therefore, they are not fully suitable for practical applications. In this paper, we propose a novel SCA-polar differential power attack (polar DPA). We found that DPA peaks have different biases for different cryptographic algorithms and implementations. Based on these biases, we can successfully attack a block cipher, assuming that the cipher algorithm uses a secret key in its first round, without the knowledge of the cipher algorithm or implementation. Other rounds can be treated as a black box. We present a detailed theoretical analysis and experiment to demonstrate the correctness and efficiency of our scheme. Furthermore, our scheme has demonstrated an improvement over the leakage evaluation scheme due to Ichikawa et al. (CHES 2005). Our evaluation method can be used in electronic design automatic (EDA) flows and can help security circuit designers to understand the data leakage due to SCAs. |
英文摘要 | Side channel attacks (SCAs) on security software and hardware have become major concerns on computer and system security. The existing SCAs generally require the knowledge of the corresponding cryptographic algorithm and implementation adopted in the target; therefore, they are not fully suitable for practical applications. In this paper, we propose a novel SCA-polar differential power attack (polar DPA). We found that DPA peaks have different biases for different cryptographic algorithms and implementations. Based on these biases, we can successfully attack a block cipher, assuming that the cipher algorithm uses a secret key in its first round, without the knowledge of the cipher algorithm or implementation. Other rounds can be treated as a black box. We present a detailed theoretical analysis and experiment to demonstrate the correctness and efficiency of our scheme. Furthermore, our scheme has demonstrated an improvement over the leakage evaluation scheme due to Ichikawa et al. (CHES 2005). Our evaluation method can be used in electronic design automatic (EDA) flows and can help security circuit designers to understand the data leakage due to SCAs. |
学科主题 | Computer Science |
收录类别 | SCI |
资助信息 | National Natural Science Foundation of China 60970116, 60970115, 90718006, 61003267 |
语种 | 英语 |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000305330600010 |
公开日期 | 2013-09-17 |
源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15070] ![]() |
专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_期刊论文 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tang Ming,Qiu ZhenLong,Gao Si,et al. polar differential power attacks and evaluation[J]. SCIENCE CHINA-INFORMATION SCIENCES,2012,55(7):1588-1604. |
APA | Tang Ming.,Qiu ZhenLong.,Gao Si.,Yi Mu.,Liu ShuBo.,...&Jin YingZhen.(2012).polar differential power attacks and evaluation.SCIENCE CHINA-INFORMATION SCIENCES,55(7),1588-1604. |
MLA | Tang Ming,et al."polar differential power attacks and evaluation".SCIENCE CHINA-INFORMATION SCIENCES 55.7(2012):1588-1604. |
入库方式: OAI收割
来源:软件研究所
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