Equilibrium games in networks
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Li, Angsheng (1) ; Zhang, Xiaohui (1) ; Pan, Yicheng (1) ; Peng, Pan (1) |
| 刊名 | Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
 |
| 出版日期 | 2014 |
| 卷号 | 416页码:49-60 |
| ISSN号 | 3784371 |
| 通讯作者 | Li, Angsheng |
| 中文摘要 | It seems a universal phenomenon of networks that the attacks on a small number of nodes by an adversary player Alice may generate a global cascading failure of the networks. It has been shown (Li et al.; 2013) that classic scale-free networks (Barabási and Albert, 1999, Barabási, 2009) are insecure against attacks of as small as O(logn) many nodes. This poses a natural and fundamental question: Can we introduce a second player Bob to prevent Alice from global cascading failure of the networks? We proposed a game in networks. We say that a network has an equilibrium game if the second player Bob has a strategy to balance the cascading influence of attacks by the adversary player Alice. It was shown that networks of the preferential attachment model (Barabási and Albert, 1999) fail to have equilibrium games, that random graphs of the Erdös-Rényi model (Erdös and Rényi, 1959, Erdös and Rényi, 1960) have, for which randomness is the mechanism, and that homophyly networks (Li et al.; 2013) have equilibrium games, for which homophyly and preferential attachment are the underlying mechanisms. We found that some real networks have equilibrium games, but most real networks fail to have. We anticipate that our results lead to an interesting new direction of network theory, that is, equilibrium games in networks. |
| 英文摘要 | It seems a universal phenomenon of networks that the attacks on a small number of nodes by an adversary player Alice may generate a global cascading failure of the networks. It has been shown (Li et al.; 2013) that classic scale-free networks (Barabási and Albert, 1999, Barabási, 2009) are insecure against attacks of as small as O(logn) many nodes. This poses a natural and fundamental question: Can we introduce a second player Bob to prevent Alice from global cascading failure of the networks? We proposed a game in networks. We say that a network has an equilibrium game if the second player Bob has a strategy to balance the cascading influence of attacks by the adversary player Alice. It was shown that networks of the preferential attachment model (Barabási and Albert, 1999) fail to have equilibrium games, that random graphs of the Erdös-Rényi model (Erdös and Rényi, 1959, Erdös and Rényi, 1960) have, for which randomness is the mechanism, and that homophyly networks (Li et al.; 2013) have equilibrium games, for which homophyly and preferential attachment are the underlying mechanisms. We found that some real networks have equilibrium games, but most real networks fail to have. We anticipate that our results lead to an interesting new direction of network theory, that is, equilibrium games in networks. |
| 收录类别 | EI |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000345725300005 |
| 公开日期 | 2014-12-16 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/17013]  |
| 专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_期刊论文 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Li, Angsheng ,Zhang, Xiaohui ,Pan, Yicheng ,et al. Equilibrium games in networks[J]. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,2014,416:49-60. |
| APA | Li, Angsheng ,Zhang, Xiaohui ,Pan, Yicheng ,&Peng, Pan .(2014).Equilibrium games in networks.Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,416,49-60. |
| MLA | Li, Angsheng ,et al."Equilibrium games in networks".Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 416(2014):49-60. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：软件研究所
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