Practical-time related-key attack on Hummingbird-2
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Shi, ZQ ; Zhang, B ; Feng, DG |
| 刊名 | IET INFORMATION SECURITY
 |
| 出版日期 | 2015 |
| 卷号 | 9期号:6页码:321-327 |
| 关键词 | divide and conquer methods cryptography practical-time related-key attack Hummingbird-2 lightweight cipher MAC functionality cryptographic notion combination points differential equation internal state bits divide and conquer strategy cryptographic S-boxes |
| ISSN号 | 1751-8709 |
| 中文摘要 | Hummingbird-2, designed by Engels et al., is a lightweight cipher with built-in MAC functionality. In this study, the authors examine the security of Hummingbird-2 in the related-key model. First, the authors define a new cryptographic notion of an S-box, called combination points, based on its differential equation, and demonstrate some properties of combination points. A potential application of the new notion is to recover some partial input of an S-box, and the authors show this on Hummingbird-2 by recovering some internal state bits. Then, by carefully studying the differential distributions of the S-boxes, a set of key dependent S-boxes can be derived and be used to recover the subkey word of Hummingbird-2. At last, by the divide and conquer strategy, all the 128 key bits can be recovered with a complexity of 2(40), which is much lower than that (2(64)) of the attack at FSE 2013. The attack has been fully implemented on a PC and the secret key has been recovered in a few hours. The results provide some new insights into the design of cryptographic S-boxes. |
| 英文摘要 | Hummingbird-2, designed by Engels et al., is a lightweight cipher with built-in MAC functionality. In this study, the authors examine the security of Hummingbird-2 in the related-key model. First, the authors define a new cryptographic notion of an S-box, called combination points, based on its differential equation, and demonstrate some properties of combination points. A potential application of the new notion is to recover some partial input of an S-box, and the authors show this on Hummingbird-2 by recovering some internal state bits. Then, by carefully studying the differential distributions of the S-boxes, a set of key dependent S-boxes can be derived and be used to recover the subkey word of Hummingbird-2. At last, by the divide and conquer strategy, all the 128 key bits can be recovered with a complexity of 2(40), which is much lower than that (2(64)) of the attack at FSE 2013. The attack has been fully implemented on a PC and the secret key has been recovered in a few hours. The results provide some new insights into the design of cryptographic S-boxes. |
| 收录类别 | SCI |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000362505000003 |
| 公开日期 | 2016-12-13 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/17431]  |
| 专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_期刊论文 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Shi, ZQ,Zhang, B,Feng, DG. Practical-time related-key attack on Hummingbird-2[J]. IET INFORMATION SECURITY,2015,9(6):321-327. |
| APA | Shi, ZQ,Zhang, B,&Feng, DG.(2015).Practical-time related-key attack on Hummingbird-2.IET INFORMATION SECURITY,9(6),321-327. |
| MLA | Shi, ZQ,et al."Practical-time related-key attack on Hummingbird-2".IET INFORMATION SECURITY 9.6(2015):321-327. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：软件研究所
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