new observations on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia
文献类型：会议论文
| 作者 | Liu Ya ; Li Leibo ; Gu Dawu ; Wang Xiaoyun ; Liu Zhiqiang ; Chen Jiazhe ; Li Wei |
| 出版日期 | 2012 |
| 会议名称 | 19th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2012 |
| 会议日期 | March 19, 2012 - March 21, 2012 |
| 会议地点 | Washington, DC, United states |
| 关键词 | Lyapunov methods Security of data |
| 页码 | 90-109 |
| 中文摘要 | Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, by exploiting some interesting properties of the key-dependent layer, we improve previous results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia and gain some new observations. First, we introduce some new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia for weak keys. These weak keys that work for the impossible differential take 3/4 of the whole key space, therefore, we further get rid of the weak-key assumption and leverage the attacks on reduced-round Camellia to all keys by utilizing the multiplied method. Second, we build a set of differentials which contains at least one 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two FL/FL-1 layers. Following this new result, we show that the key-dependent transformations inserted in Camellia cannot resist impossible differential cryptanalysis effectively. Based on this set of differentials, we present a new cryptanalytic strategy to mount impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia. © 2012 Springer-Verlag. |
| 英文摘要 | Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, by exploiting some interesting properties of the key-dependent layer, we improve previous results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia and gain some new observations. First, we introduce some new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia for weak keys. These weak keys that work for the impossible differential take 3/4 of the whole key space, therefore, we further get rid of the weak-key assumption and leverage the attacks on reduced-round Camellia to all keys by utilizing the multiplied method. Second, we build a set of differentials which contains at least one 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two FL/FL-1 layers. Following this new result, we show that the key-dependent transformations inserted in Camellia cannot resist impossible differential cryptanalysis effectively. Based on this set of differentials, we present a new cryptanalytic strategy to mount impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia. © 2012 Springer-Verlag. |
| 收录类别 | EI |
| 会议录 | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| ISSN号 | 0302-9743 |
| ISBN号 | 9783642340468 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15767]  |
| 专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Liu Ya,Li Leibo,Gu Dawu,et al. new observations on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia[C]. 见:19th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2012. Washington, DC, United states. March 19, 2012 - March 21, 2012. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：软件研究所
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