Denial-of-service security attack in the continuous-time world
文献类型：会议论文
| 作者 | Wang, Shuling (1) ; Nielson, Flemming (2) ; Nielson, Hanne Riis (2) |
| 出版日期 | 2014 |
| 会议名称 | 34th IFIPWG6.1 International Conference on Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems, FORTE 2014 - Held as Part of the 9th International Federated Conference on Distributed Computing Techniques, DisCoTec 2014 |
| 会议日期 | June 3, 2014 - June 5, 2014 |
| 会议地点 | Berlin, Germany |
| 关键词 | Hybrid systems Denial-of-service Safety verification Inference system |
| 页码 | 149-165 |
| 中文摘要 | Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service security attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This paper proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for verifying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the environments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control system. © 2014 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing. |
| 英文摘要 | Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service security attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This paper proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for verifying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the environments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control system. © 2014 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing. |
| 收录类别 | CPCI ; EI |
| 会议录出版地 | Springer Verlag |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| ISSN号 | 3029743 |
| ISBN号 | 9783662436127 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16503]  |
| 专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wang, Shuling ,Nielson, Flemming ,Nielson, Hanne Riis . Denial-of-service security attack in the continuous-time world[C]. 见:34th IFIPWG6.1 International Conference on Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems, FORTE 2014 - Held as Part of the 9th International Federated Conference on Distributed Computing Techniques, DisCoTec 2014. Berlin, Germany. June 3, 2014 - June 5, 2014. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：软件研究所
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