HyperVerify: A VM-assisted Architecture for Monitoring Hypervisor Non-control Data
文献类型：会议论文
| 作者 | Ding, Baozeng ; He, Yeping ; Wu, Yanjun ; Lin, Yuqi |
| 出版日期 | 2013 |
| 会议名称 | 7th IEEE International Conference on Software Security and Reliability (SERE) |
| 会议日期 | JUN 18-20, 2013 |
| 会议地点 | Gaithersburg, MD |
| 关键词 | virtualization hypervisor introspection non-control data |
| 页码 | 26-35 |
| 中文摘要 | Continuing bug reports and exploits in hypervisors indicate that hypervisors face similar integrity threats as tradition software. Previous approaches to protect a hypervisor that utilize hardware features are not easy to be extended. Besides, they mainly focus on code or control data integrity, without pay much attention to protecting non-control data. In this paper, we present HyperVerify, a novel architecture to monitor hypervisor non-control data using a trusted VM. Since a VM cannot directly access a hypervisor's memory, HyperVerify programs a popular device driver to read the hypervisor's hardware state in the trusted VM. Then a memory analysis library is used to translate the low-level hardware state into the high level hypervisor context. Several monitoring processes use such context to monitor hypervisor non-control data integrity. Each of the processes is responsible for monitoring one kind of non-control data. It is flexible for HyperVerify to support monitoring new kinds of data structure. The experimental evaluation of our prototype shows that HyperVerify incurs at most 4% performance overhead to end users. |
| 英文摘要 | Continuing bug reports and exploits in hypervisors indicate that hypervisors face similar integrity threats as tradition software. Previous approaches to protect a hypervisor that utilize hardware features are not easy to be extended. Besides, they mainly focus on code or control data integrity, without pay much attention to protecting non-control data. In this paper, we present HyperVerify, a novel architecture to monitor hypervisor non-control data using a trusted VM. Since a VM cannot directly access a hypervisor's memory, HyperVerify programs a popular device driver to read the hypervisor's hardware state in the trusted VM. Then a memory analysis library is used to translate the low-level hardware state into the high level hypervisor context. Several monitoring processes use such context to monitor hypervisor non-control data integrity. Each of the processes is responsible for monitoring one kind of non-control data. It is flexible for HyperVerify to support monitoring new kinds of data structure. The experimental evaluation of our prototype shows that HyperVerify incurs at most 4% performance overhead to end users. |
| 收录类别 | CPCI |
| 会议录出版地 | IEEE COMPUTER SOC |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| ISBN号 | 978-0-7695-5030-5 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16531]  |
| 专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ding, Baozeng,He, Yeping,Wu, Yanjun,et al. HyperVerify: A VM-assisted Architecture for Monitoring Hypervisor Non-control Data[C]. 见:7th IEEE International Conference on Software Security and Reliability (SERE). Gaithersburg, MD. JUN 18-20, 2013. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：软件研究所
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