中国科学院机构知识库网格
Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
Minority games with score-dependent and agent-dependent payoffs

文献类型:期刊论文

作者Ren, F.; Zheng, B.; Qiu, T.; Trimper, S.
刊名PHYSICAL REVIEW E
出版日期2006-10-01
卷号74页码:8
ISSN号1539-3755
DOI10.1103/PhysRevE.74.041111
英文摘要Score-dependent and agent-dependent payoffs of the strategies are introduced into the standard minority game. The intrinsic periodicity is consequently removed, and the stylized facts arise, such as long-range volatility correlations and "fat tails" in the distribution of the returns. The agent dependence of the payoffs is essential in producing the long-range volatility correlations. The new payoffs lead to a better performance in the dynamic behavior nonlocal in time, and can coexist with the inactive strategy. We also observe that the standard deviation sigma(2)/N is significantly reduced, thus the efficiency of the system is distinctly improved. Based on this observation, we give a qualitative explanation for the long-range volatility correlations.
WOS关键词FINANCIAL-MARKETS ; STYLIZED FACTS ; TIME-SERIES ; PERSISTENCE PROBABILITY ; STATISTICAL PROPERTIES ; PRICE FLUCTUATIONS ; ECONOMIC INDEX ; BEHAVIOR ; MODEL ; VOLATILITY
WOS研究方向Physics
语种英语
WOS记录号WOS:000241722900019
出版者AMER PHYSICAL SOC
源URL[http://119.78.100.186/handle/113462/26681]  
专题中国科学院近代物理研究所
通讯作者Ren, F.
作者单位1.Zhejiang Univ, Inst Modern Phys, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China
2.ISI Fdn, Multi Agents Complex Syst Div, I-10133 Turin, Italy
3.Univ Halle Wittenberg, FB Phys, D-06099 Halle, Germany
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GB/T 7714
Ren, F.,Zheng, B.,Qiu, T.,et al. Minority games with score-dependent and agent-dependent payoffs[J]. PHYSICAL REVIEW E,2006,74:8.
APA Ren, F.,Zheng, B.,Qiu, T.,&Trimper, S..(2006).Minority games with score-dependent and agent-dependent payoffs.PHYSICAL REVIEW E,74,8.
MLA Ren, F.,et al."Minority games with score-dependent and agent-dependent payoffs".PHYSICAL REVIEW E 74(2006):8.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:近代物理研究所

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