中国科学院机构知识库网格
Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
towardsatheoryofgamebasednonequilibriumcontrolsystems

文献类型:期刊论文

作者Mu Yifen; Guo Lei
刊名journalofsystemsscienceandcomplexity
出版日期2012
卷号25期号:2页码:209
ISSN号1009-6124
英文摘要This paper considers optimization problems for a new kind of control systems based on non-equilibrium dynamic games. To be precise, the authors consider the infinitely repeated games between a human and a machine based on the generic 2x2 game with fixed machine strategy of finite k-step memory. By introducing and analyzing the state transfer graphes (STG), it will be shown that the system state will become periodic after finite steps under the optimal strategy that maximizes the human's averaged payoff, which helps us to ease the task of finding the optimal strategy considerably. Moreover, the question whether the optimizer will win or lose is investigated and some interesting phenomena are found, e.g., for the standard Prisoner's Dilemma game, the human will not lose to the machine while optimizing her own averaged payoff when k = 1; however, when k a parts per thousand yen 2, she may indeed lose if she focuses on optimizing her own payoff only. The robustness of the optimal strategy and identification problem are also considered. It appears that both the framework and the results are beyond those in the classical control theory and the traditional game theory.
资助项目[National Natural Science Foundation of China] ; [Chinese Academy of Sciences]
语种英语
源URL[http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/46682]  
专题系统科学研究所
国家数学与交叉科学中心
作者单位中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
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GB/T 7714
Mu Yifen,Guo Lei. towardsatheoryofgamebasednonequilibriumcontrolsystems[J]. journalofsystemsscienceandcomplexity,2012,25(2):209.
APA Mu Yifen,&Guo Lei.(2012).towardsatheoryofgamebasednonequilibriumcontrolsystems.journalofsystemsscienceandcomplexity,25(2),209.
MLA Mu Yifen,et al."towardsatheoryofgamebasednonequilibriumcontrolsystems".journalofsystemsscienceandcomplexity 25.2(2012):209.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:数学与系统科学研究院

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