Coordination contract design for the newsvendor model
文献类型:期刊论文
作者 | Li, Linqiu1,2,3; Liu, Ke1,2,3![]() |
刊名 | EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
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出版日期 | 2020-05-16 |
卷号 | 283期号:1页码:380-389 |
关键词 | Supply chain management Game theory Asymmetric information Mechanism design |
ISSN号 | 0377-2217 |
DOI | 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.10.045 |
英文摘要 | We design contracts to coordinate the newsvendor setting with a supplier and a retailer. Traditional approaches begin with a restricted set of contracts. However, we design mechanisms in a more general way by directly constructing payment schemes to satisfy incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality. Under symmetric information, coordinating contracts in the literature can be interpreted by this method. Under asymmetric information, we model the retailer's private demand information as a space of either continuous or discrete states. In the continuous case, wholesale price contracts cause system inefficiency and there exists a unique optimal wholesale price for the supplier if the distribution of forecast error has IFR (Increasing Failure Rate) property. We further characterize the structure of coordinating payment, and find that the set of coordinating contracts is restricted to special two-part tariffs where wholesale price equals unit production cost. In the discrete case, contrary to expectation, linear wholesale price contracts achieve coordination. With demand forecast distributed more and more densely on its support, the interval of coordinating wholesale prices gradually shrinks to the unit production cost. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science |
语种 | 英语 |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000510524300028 |
出版者 | ELSEVIER |
源URL | [http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/50789] ![]() |
专题 | 应用数学研究所 |
通讯作者 | Li, Linqiu |
作者单位 | 1.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 2.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 3.Chinese Acad Sci, Key Lab Management Decis & Informat Syst, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Li, Linqiu,Liu, Ke. Coordination contract design for the newsvendor model[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,2020,283(1):380-389. |
APA | Li, Linqiu,&Liu, Ke.(2020).Coordination contract design for the newsvendor model.EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,283(1),380-389. |
MLA | Li, Linqiu,et al."Coordination contract design for the newsvendor model".EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 283.1(2020):380-389. |
入库方式: OAI收割
来源:数学与系统科学研究院
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