Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information
文献类型:期刊论文
作者 | Hou Wenhua2; Yao Li3; Wang Shouyang1 |
刊名 | 系统工程与电子技术:英文版
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出版日期 | 2002 |
卷号 | 000期号:1.0页码:74-79 |
关键词 | Stackelberg model, Bayesian equilibrium, Belief equilibrium. |
ISSN号 | 1004-4132 |
其他题名 | Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information |
英文摘要 | In the Bayesian game models, the uncertainty is described with probability, but sometimes the uncertainty in practice is given by some fuzzy parameters, and the objectives of players may be not to maximize the expected payoffs. In this paper, a new subjective equilibrium is given for fuzzy games. We make a powerful comparison with Bayesian and equilibria for Stackelberg duopoly game with fuzzy costs. It is showed that endogenous Stackelberg leadership is related with not only marginal costs but also beliefs of the firms. |
语种 | 中文 |
CSCD记录号 | CSCD:1363044 |
源URL | [http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/53583] ![]() |
专题 | 中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院 |
作者单位 | 1.中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院 2.南开大学 3.School of Mathematics and Statistics, Hebei Economics and Trade University |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hou Wenhua,Yao Li,Wang Shouyang. Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information[J]. 系统工程与电子技术:英文版,2002,000(1.0):74-79. |
APA | Hou Wenhua,Yao Li,&Wang Shouyang.(2002).Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information.系统工程与电子技术:英文版,000(1.0),74-79. |
MLA | Hou Wenhua,et al."Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information".系统工程与电子技术:英文版 000.1.0(2002):74-79. |
入库方式: OAI收割
来源:数学与系统科学研究院
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