中国科学院机构知识库网格
Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information

文献类型:期刊论文

作者Hou Wenhua2; Yao Li3; Wang Shouyang1
刊名系统工程与电子技术:英文版
出版日期2002
卷号000期号:1.0页码:74-79
关键词Stackelberg model, Bayesian equilibrium, Belief equilibrium.
ISSN号1004-4132
其他题名Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information
英文摘要In the Bayesian game models, the uncertainty is described with probability, but sometimes the uncertainty in practice is given by some fuzzy parameters, and the objectives of players may be not to maximize the expected payoffs. In this paper, a new subjective equilibrium is given for fuzzy games. We make a powerful comparison with Bayesian and equilibria for Stackelberg duopoly game with fuzzy costs. It is showed that endogenous Stackelberg leadership is related with not only marginal costs but also beliefs of the firms.
语种中文
CSCD记录号CSCD:1363044
源URL[http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/53583]  
专题中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
作者单位1.中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院
2.南开大学
3.School of Mathematics and Statistics, Hebei Economics and Trade University
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Hou Wenhua,Yao Li,Wang Shouyang. Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information[J]. 系统工程与电子技术:英文版,2002,000(1.0):74-79.
APA Hou Wenhua,Yao Li,&Wang Shouyang.(2002).Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information.系统工程与电子技术:英文版,000(1.0),74-79.
MLA Hou Wenhua,et al."Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information".系统工程与电子技术:英文版 000.1.0(2002):74-79.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:数学与系统科学研究院

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