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Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler

文献类型:期刊论文

作者Chen, Xujin2,3; Hu, Xiaodong2,3; Wang, Chenhao1,2,3; Wu, Xiaoying2,3
刊名THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE
出版日期2020-10-24
卷号838页码:180-194
关键词Load balancing game Price of anarchy Price of stability Decision-making principle Nash equilibrium
ISSN号0304-3975
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2020.07.024
英文摘要We study the efficiency of Nash equilibria for the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler. In the game, we are given a set of facilities and a set of players along with a scheduler, where each facility is associated with a linear cost function, and the players are randomly ordered by the scheduler. Each player chooses exactly one of these facilities to fulfill his task, which incurs to him a cost depending on not only the cost function of the facility he chooses and the players who choose the same facility (as in a usual load balancing game), but also his uncertain position in the uniform random ordering. From an individual perspective, each player tries to choose a facility for optimizing his own objective that is determined by a certain decision-making principle. From a system perspective, it is desirable to minimize the maximum cost among all players, which is a commonly used criterion for load balancing. We estimate the price of anarchy and price of stability for this class of load balancing games under uncertainty, provided all players follow one of the four decision-making principles, namely the bottom-out, win-or-go-home, minimum-expected-cost, and minimax-regret principles. Our results show that the efficiency loss of Nash equilibria in these decentralized environments heavily rely on player's attitude toward the uncertainty. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
资助项目MOST of China[2018AAA0101002] ; NNSF of China[11531014] ; CAS[ZDBS-LY7008]
WOS研究方向Computer Science
语种英语
WOS记录号WOS:000566368800014
出版者ELSEVIER
源URL[http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/52081]  
专题应用数学研究所
通讯作者Wu, Xiaoying
作者单位1.City Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Math Sci, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
3.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Chen, Xujin,Hu, Xiaodong,Wang, Chenhao,et al. The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler[J]. THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE,2020,838:180-194.
APA Chen, Xujin,Hu, Xiaodong,Wang, Chenhao,&Wu, Xiaoying.(2020).The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler.THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE,838,180-194.
MLA Chen, Xujin,et al."The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler".THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE 838(2020):180-194.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:数学与系统科学研究院

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