Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Ren, Yisheng1; Lu, Lin2; Yu, Hu3; Zhu, Daocai4 |
| 刊名 | JOURNAL OF GEOGRAPHICAL SCIENCES
 |
| 出版日期 | 2021-08-01 |
| 卷号 | 31期号:8页码:1205-1221 |
| 关键词 | eco-compensation scalar jumping institutional stickiness game strategy Xin'an River Basin |
| ISSN号 | 1009-637X |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11442-021-1893-1 |
| 通讯作者 | Lu, Lin(llin@263.net) |
| 英文摘要 | China's policy on ecological compensation (eco-compensation) in watershed ecosystems is of economic, social and environmental significance for China's ecological governance and protection of natural areas. It involves balancing the interests of regional stakeholders, coordinating the development of regional environments and establishing effective cooperation models, making it a classic topic for geographical research. This study introduces the concept of institutional "stickiness" to the theory of politics of scale to analyze the features and mechanisms of the game behavior of government entities in the process of implementing watershed eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin. Our results show the following: government entities at various levels, including the central, provincial and municipal governments, experienced the three stages of game strategy of competition, cooperation and "coopetition"; building a government community of shared interests can promote watershed eco-compensation, and "appropriate intervention" by the central government is key to achieving inter-provincial watershed eco-compensation; there was clear institutional stickiness during the transition from a "vertical" model of watershed eco-compensation to a "vertical-horizontal" model, with government entities using policy innovations and social participation to limit and reduce stickiness so as to reshape the watershed eco-compensation system; scalar jumping is the core mechanism that promoted eco-compensation in the study basin, and government entities shaped the discourse on watershed eco-compensation by redistributing powers and capital and creating informal constraints, which promoted the transformation of eco-compensation from a "strong state-weak society" structural model, to a "strong state-strong society" model in the Xin'an River Basin. These results can provide theoretical support for the construction of inter-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanisms, provide a scientific basis for the rational evaluation and guidance of watershed eco-compensation practices, and promote the coordinated and sustainable socioeconomic development of watersheds. |
| WOS关键词 | SERVICE ; MODEL |
| 资助项目 | Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China[41930644] |
| WOS研究方向 | Physical Geography |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000682661600008 |
| 出版者 | SCIENCE PRESS |
| 资助机构 | Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China |
| 源URL | [http://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/164681]  |
| 专题 | 中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所 |
| 通讯作者 | Lu, Lin |
| 作者单位 | 1.Anhui Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhu 241002, Anhui, Peoples R China 2.Anhui Normal Univ, Sch Geog & Tourism, Wuhu 241002, Anhui, Peoples R China 3.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Geog Sci & Nat Resources Res, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China 4.Anhui Univ Finance & Econ, City & Cty Res Ctr, Bengbu 233030, Anhui, Peoples R China |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ren, Yisheng,Lu, Lin,Yu, Hu,et al. Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale[J]. JOURNAL OF GEOGRAPHICAL SCIENCES,2021,31(8):1205-1221. |
| APA | Ren, Yisheng,Lu, Lin,Yu, Hu,&Zhu, Daocai.(2021).Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale.JOURNAL OF GEOGRAPHICAL SCIENCES,31(8),1205-1221. |
| MLA | Ren, Yisheng,et al."Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale".JOURNAL OF GEOGRAPHICAL SCIENCES 31.8(2021):1205-1221. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：地理科学与资源研究所
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