Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Cao, Zhigang1; Chen, Bo2; Chen, Xujin3,4 ; Wang, Changjun3,5
|
| 刊名 | OPERATIONS RESEARCH
 |
| 出版日期 | 2021-07-20 |
| 页码 | 17 |
| 关键词 | selfish atomic routing deterministic queuing adaptive routing subgame perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium |
| ISSN号 | 0030-364X |
| DOI | 10.1287/opre.2021.2105 |
| 英文摘要 | We propose a game model for selfish routing of atomic agents, who compete for use of a network to travel from their origins to a common destination as quickly as possible. We follow a frequently used rule that the latency an agent experiences on each edge is a constant transit time plus a variable waiting time in a queue. A key feature that differentiates our model from related ones is an edge-based tie-breaking rule for prioritizing agents in queueing when they reach an edge at the same time. We study both nonadaptive agents (each choosing a one-off origin-destination path simultaneously at the very beginning) and adaptive ones (each making an online decision at every nonterminal vertex they reach as to which next edge to take). On the one hand, we constructively prove that a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) always exists for nonadaptive agents and show that every NE is weakly Pareto optimal and globally first-in first-out. We present efficient algorithms for finding an NE and best responses of nonadaptive agents. On the other hand, we are among the first to consider adaptive atomic agents, for which we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) always exists and that each NE outcome for nonadaptive agents is an SPE outcome for adaptive agents but not vice versa. |
| 资助项目 | Ministry of Science and Technology of China[2018AAA0101002] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[11601022] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[11971046] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71922003] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71871009] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[71961137005] ; Young Elite Scientists Sponsorship Program by CAST[2018QNRC001] ; Chinese Academy of Sciences[XDA27010102] ; Chinese Academy of Sciences[ZDBS-LY-7008] |
| WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000708983500001 |
| 出版者 | INFORMS |
| 源URL | [http://ir.amss.ac.cn/handle/2S8OKBNM/59428]  |
| 专题 | 应用数学研究所 |
| 通讯作者 | Wang, Changjun |
| 作者单位 | 1.Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China 2.Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England 3.Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 4.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Math Sci, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China 5.Beijing Univ Technol, Coll Math, Fac Sci, Beijing 100124, Peoples R China |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Cao, Zhigang,Chen, Bo,Chen, Xujin,et al. Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents[J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH,2021:17. |
| APA | Cao, Zhigang,Chen, Bo,Chen, Xujin,&Wang, Changjun.(2021).Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents.OPERATIONS RESEARCH,17. |
| MLA | Cao, Zhigang,et al."Atomic Dynamic Flow Games: Adaptive vs. Nonadaptive Agents".OPERATIONS RESEARCH (2021):17. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：数学与系统科学研究院
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