Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households' Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019
文献类型:期刊论文
作者 | Zheng, Suwen1; Ye, Chunhui1; Bai, Yunli2 |
刊名 | SUSTAINABILITY |
出版日期 | 2023-05-23 |
卷号 | 15期号:11页码:34 |
关键词 | supervision public goods villagers' participation constraint mechanism clan |
DOI | 10.3390/su15118438 |
通讯作者 | Ye, Chunhui(cye@zju.edu.cn) |
英文摘要 | This paper mainly studies the effect of village-level power supervision reform on the rural supply of public goods. In this paper, the panel data of 100 villages in five provinces of China from 2005 to 2019 are used to identify and analyze the impact of the supervision policy on the supply of rural public goods. The study adopted PSM-DID as the identification strategy to alleviate the endogenous problem of the model; it found that the supervision policy significantly improved the supply of public goods in villages, and increased the satisfaction of villagers with the village economic base and public social services. There is regional heterogeneity in the improvement effect of policy on public goods supply, which mainly reflects the regions with weak economic development. This policy mainly promotes the optimization of public goods supply by strengthening villagers' public participation, and promoting the improvement of the current situation of public goods by restraining village cadres' duty behaviors. It is also found that the coupling of clan power and village formal authority can inhibit the positive effects brought by the policy, and only in areas with strong clan power can the negative effects be mitigated. Moreover, there is an alternative relationship between the assessment pressure of village cadres and the supervision force sent to the countryside, which will form a situation of excessive supervision and inhibit the optimization of village public goods. The conclusion of this paper provides empirical support for the view that "top-down external institutional supervision and bottom-up internal democratic supervision should be effectively integrated" in the theory of village power supervision. |
WOS关键词 | GRASS-ROOTS DEMOCRACY ; LOCAL GOVERNANCE ; FISCAL REFORM ; PROVISION ; PARTICIPATION ; ELECTIONS ; POLITICS ; VILLAGE ; TRUST |
资助项目 | National Social Science Fundation of China[22ZD081] |
WOS研究方向 | Science & Technology - Other Topics ; Environmental Sciences & Ecology |
语种 | 英语 |
出版者 | MDPI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:001005808000001 |
资助机构 | National Social Science Fundation of China |
源URL | [http://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/194950] |
专题 | 中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所 |
通讯作者 | Ye, Chunhui |
作者单位 | 1.Zhejiang Univ, China Acad Rural Dev, Sch Publ Affairs, Hangzhou 310058, Peoples R China 2.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Geog Sci & Nat Resources Res, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zheng, Suwen,Ye, Chunhui,Bai, Yunli. Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households' Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019[J]. SUSTAINABILITY,2023,15(11):34. |
APA | Zheng, Suwen,Ye, Chunhui,&Bai, Yunli.(2023).Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households' Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019.SUSTAINABILITY,15(11),34. |
MLA | Zheng, Suwen,et al."Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households' Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019".SUSTAINABILITY 15.11(2023):34. |
入库方式: OAI收割
来源:地理科学与资源研究所
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