Mechanism and simulation of intensive use of urban inefficient land based on evolutionary game theory
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Han, Ze4; Deng, Xiangzheng1,2,3,4; Li, Zhihui3,4; Huang, Xiankai1 |
| 刊名 | JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS
 |
| 出版日期 | 2024-12-01 |
| 卷号 | 95页码:101840 |
| 关键词 | urban inefficient land redevelopment evolutionary game stakeholders decision-making behavior dynamic simulation |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.asieco.2024.101840 |
| 产权排序 | 1 |
| 文献子类 | Article |
| 英文摘要 | Intensive utilization of urban inefficient land is crucial for achieving sustainable urban development. This study constructs an evolutionary game model of urban inefficient land redevelopment involving three main actors: the government, developers, and the public. The model reveals the staged characteristics of the redevelopment process and the dynamic evolution of decision- making behaviors among the actors. The study finds that the redevelopment process can be divided into three stages: initial, development, and mature, with significant differences in the decision-making behaviors of developers, the government, and the public at each stage. Developers' decisions are influenced by redevelopment benefits and costs, the government's decisions are affected by regulatory benefits, and the public's decisions are impacted by participation benefits and costs. The initial strategy configuration has a significant influence on the system's evolutionary trend. Economic incentives, cost constraints, and public participation are the three pillars driving redevelopment. The study recommends adopting differentiated and dynamic policy combinations, improving the redevelopment benefit distribution mechanism, and strengthening public participation capacity building to promote positive interactions among the actors and achieve efficient land resource utilization. This research systematically analyzes the mechanism of inefficient land redevelopment from a dynamic game perspective, providing a scientific basis for policy formulation and holding great significance for promoting sustainable urban development. |
| WOS关键词 | CHINA ; REDEVELOPMENT ; PARTICIPATION ; RENEWAL ; POLICY ; MARKET ; STATE ; PRICE |
| WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:001361270600001 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/209480]  |
| 专题 | 陆地表层格局与模拟院重点实验室_外文论文 |
| 通讯作者 | Huang, Xiankai |
| 作者单位 | 1.Beijing Technol & Business Univ, Beijing 100048, Peoples R China 2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China 3.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Coll Resources & Environm, Beijing 101408, Peoples R China 4.Chinese Acad Sci, Key Lab Land Surface Pattern & Simulat, Inst Geog Sci & Nat Resources Res, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Han, Ze,Deng, Xiangzheng,Li, Zhihui,et al. Mechanism and simulation of intensive use of urban inefficient land based on evolutionary game theory[J]. JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS,2024,95:101840. |
| APA | Han, Ze,Deng, Xiangzheng,Li, Zhihui,&Huang, Xiankai.(2024).Mechanism and simulation of intensive use of urban inefficient land based on evolutionary game theory.JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS,95,101840. |
| MLA | Han, Ze,et al."Mechanism and simulation of intensive use of urban inefficient land based on evolutionary game theory".JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS 95(2024):101840. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：地理科学与资源研究所
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