Interplay of carbon pricing and emission policies: A game-theoretic study of China's electricity market
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Zhang, Chao3; Fan, Yupeng1,2,3; Fang, Chuanglin1,2,3 |
| 刊名 | ENERGY
 |
| 出版日期 | 2026-02-15 |
| 卷号 | 345页码:140103 |
| 关键词 | Carbon trading Power enterprises Energy transition Stackelberg game model |
| ISSN号 | 0360-5442 |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.energy.2026.140103 |
| 产权排序 | 1 |
| 文献子类 | Article |
| 英文摘要 | The low-carbon transition of China's power sector is critical for meeting national and global carbon neutrality targets, and requires effective coordination between carbon pricing instruments and emission reduction policies. However, most existing studies examine these policies in isolation and overlook the complex strategic interactions among multiple stakeholders in China's electricity market. This gap limits understanding of how different policy combinations jointly affect emission outcomes, market stability, and corporate profitability. This study systematically examines the synergistic and conflicting effects of carbon pricing instruments and emission reduction measures within China's electricity market, providing quantitative evidence for formulating coordinated low-carbon policies. A multi-agent Stackelberg game model is developed to capture the strategic interactions among the central government, provincial authorities, power enterprises, and consumers. Equilibrium analysis and impact assessment are conducted across seven policy scenarios involving minimum emission reduction revenues, carbon trading prices, and electricity cost ratios. The study finds: (1) Coupling minimum emission reduction revenue with minimum carbon trading price policies undermines corporate profit stability and exacerbates carbon price volatility risks; (2) Significant disparities in provincial carbon reduction performance call for region-specific low-carbon strategies; and (3) interactions among policy interactions may reduce overall system efficiency, highlighting the importance of unified carbon market regulation. Overall, this study provides decision support and practical guidance for policymakers, regulators, and energy enterprises to optimize carbon pricing mechanisms, promote regional equity, and facilitate a balanced and orderly energy transition within the power sector. |
| URL标识 | 查看原文 |
| WOS关键词 | TRADING SCHEME ; GENERATION ; TRANSITION ; INDUSTRY ; IMPACTS |
| WOS研究方向 | Thermodynamics ; Energy & Fuels |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:001679861400001 |
| 出版者 | PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD |
| 源URL | [http://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/220983]  |
| 专题 | 区域可持续发展分析与模拟院重点实验室_外文论文 |
| 通讯作者 | Fan, Yupeng |
| 作者单位 | 1.Chinese Acad Sci, Key Lab Reg Sustainable Dev Modeling, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China; 2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China 3.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Geog Sci & Nat Resources Res, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China; |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhang, Chao,Fan, Yupeng,Fang, Chuanglin. Interplay of carbon pricing and emission policies: A game-theoretic study of China's electricity market[J]. ENERGY,2026,345:140103. |
| APA | Zhang, Chao,Fan, Yupeng,&Fang, Chuanglin.(2026).Interplay of carbon pricing and emission policies: A game-theoretic study of China's electricity market.ENERGY,345,140103. |
| MLA | Zhang, Chao,et al."Interplay of carbon pricing and emission policies: A game-theoretic study of China's electricity market".ENERGY 345(2026):140103. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：地理科学与资源研究所
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