Resolving Trans-jurisdictional Water Conflicts by the Nash Bargaining Method: A Case Study in Zhangweinan Canal Basin in North China
文献类型:SCI/SSCI论文
作者 | Zhang Y.; Zhang Y. |
发表日期 | 2013 |
关键词 | Trans-jurisdiction conflict Asymmetric Nash bargaining theory Zhangweinan Canal Basin Water quantity Water quality international river-basins game-theory resources management allocation nestos/mesta resolution framework pollution model fate |
英文摘要 | Trans-jurisdictional conflict in both water quantity and quality is a general concern in large river basins. In this paper, the relative utility function combined with the asymmetric Nash bargaining method was established to analyze the trans-jurisdictional conflict between water quantity and water quality in the Zhangweinan Canal Basin in China. The basin was divided into four conflict stakeholders, namely, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, and Shandong Provinces, based on administrative unit. The water usage and pollutant discharge scheme for multiple stakeholders was optimized using the established model to satisfy the environmental flow and water quality objectives at the identified conflict sections. The results indicated that the total water consumption was reduced from 4.38 x 10(9) m(3) in 2007 to 1.97 x 10(9) m(3), and that the allowable COD and NH3-N discharged into the river was less than 3.8 x 10(4) t and 4.3 x 10(3) t, respectively. About 81.1 % of COD and 76.1 % of NH3-N should be further reduced compared with the values in 2007. |
出处 | Water Resources Management |
卷 | 27 |
期 | 5 |
页 | 1235-1247 |
收录类别 | SCI |
语种 | 英语 |
ISSN号 | 0920-4741 |
源URL | [http://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/30182] ![]() |
专题 | 地理科学与资源研究所_历年回溯文献 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhang Y.,Zhang Y.. Resolving Trans-jurisdictional Water Conflicts by the Nash Bargaining Method: A Case Study in Zhangweinan Canal Basin in North China. 2013. |
入库方式: OAI收割
来源:地理科学与资源研究所
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