中国科学院机构知识库网格
Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
Resolving Trans-jurisdictional Water Conflicts by the Nash Bargaining Method: A Case Study in Zhangweinan Canal Basin in North China

文献类型:SCI/SSCI论文

作者Zhang Y.; Zhang Y.
发表日期2013
关键词Trans-jurisdiction conflict Asymmetric Nash bargaining theory Zhangweinan Canal Basin Water quantity Water quality international river-basins game-theory resources management allocation nestos/mesta resolution framework pollution model fate
英文摘要Trans-jurisdictional conflict in both water quantity and quality is a general concern in large river basins. In this paper, the relative utility function combined with the asymmetric Nash bargaining method was established to analyze the trans-jurisdictional conflict between water quantity and water quality in the Zhangweinan Canal Basin in China. The basin was divided into four conflict stakeholders, namely, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, and Shandong Provinces, based on administrative unit. The water usage and pollutant discharge scheme for multiple stakeholders was optimized using the established model to satisfy the environmental flow and water quality objectives at the identified conflict sections. The results indicated that the total water consumption was reduced from 4.38 x 10(9) m(3) in 2007 to 1.97 x 10(9) m(3), and that the allowable COD and NH3-N discharged into the river was less than 3.8 x 10(4) t and 4.3 x 10(3) t, respectively. About 81.1 % of COD and 76.1 % of NH3-N should be further reduced compared with the values in 2007.
出处Water Resources Management
27
5
1235-1247
收录类别SCI
语种英语
ISSN号0920-4741
源URL[http://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/30182]  
专题地理科学与资源研究所_历年回溯文献
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Zhang Y.,Zhang Y.. Resolving Trans-jurisdictional Water Conflicts by the Nash Bargaining Method: A Case Study in Zhangweinan Canal Basin in North China. 2013.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:地理科学与资源研究所

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