Social cycling and conditional responses in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Zhou, HJ
|
| 刊名 | SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
 |
| 出版日期 | 2014 |
| 卷号 | 4页码:5830 |
| 关键词 | ITERATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA TIT-FOR-TAT EVOLUTIONARY GAMES STABLE STRATEGIES LOSE-SHIFT WIN-STAY DYNAMICS CYCLES BIODIVERSITY COOPERATION |
| ISSN号 | 2045-2322 |
| 通讯作者 | Zhou, HJ (reprint author), Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Theoret Phys, State Key Lab Theoret Phys, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China. |
| 英文摘要 | How humans make decisions in non-cooperative strategic interactions is a big question. For the fundamental Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) model game system, classic Nash equilibrium (NE) theory predicts that players randomize completely their action choices to avoid being exploited, while evolutionary game theory of bounded rationality in general predicts persistent cyclic motions, especially in finite populations. However as empirical studies have been relatively sparse, it is still a controversial issue as to which theoretical framework is more appropriate to describe decision-making of human subjects. Here we observe population-level persistent cyclic motions in a laboratory experiment of the discrete-time iterated RPS game under the traditional random pairwise-matching protocol. This collective behavior contradicts with the NE theory but is quantitatively explained, without any adjustable parameter, by a microscopic model of win-lose-tie conditional response. Theoretical calculations suggest that if all players adopt the same optimized conditional response strategy, their accumulated payoff will be much higher than the reference value of the NE mixed strategy. Our work demonstrates the feasibility of understanding human competition behaviors from the angle of non-equilibrium statistical physics. |
| 学科主题 | Physics |
| 收录类别 | SCI |
| 资助信息 | Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [SSEYI2014Z]; State Key Laboratory for Theoretical Physics [Y3KF261CJ1]; Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Project of Zhejiang Province [13NDJC095YB]; National Basic Research Program of China [2013CB932804]; Knowledge Innovation Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences [KJCX2-EW-J02]; National Science Foundation of China [11121403, 11225526] |
| 原文出处 | http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep05830 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000339421300011 |
| 公开日期 | 2015-06-03 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.itp.ac.cn/handle/311006/15704]  |
| 专题 | 理论物理研究所_理论物理所1978-2010年知识产出 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhou, HJ. Social cycling and conditional responses in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game[J]. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,2014,4:5830. |
| APA | Zhou, HJ.(2014).Social cycling and conditional responses in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game.SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,4,5830. |
| MLA | Zhou, HJ."Social cycling and conditional responses in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game".SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 4(2014):5830. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：理论物理研究所
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