Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint
文献类型：期刊论文
| 作者 | Zhang, Hui1; Gao, Meng2 ; Wang, Wenting3,4; Liu, Zhiguang5
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| 刊名 | JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
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| 出版日期 | 2014-10-07 |
| 卷号 | 358页码:122-131 |
| ISSN号 | 0022-5193 |
| 关键词 | Evolution of cooperation Pair approximation Diffusion approximation External enforcement Network |
| 通讯作者 | Zhang, H (reprint author), Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Nat & Appl Sci, Dept Appl Math, Xian 710027, Shaanxi, Peoples R China. huizhang06@gmail.com |
| 产权排序 | [Zhang, Hui] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Nat & Appl Sci, Dept Appl Math, Xian 710027, Shaanxi, Peoples R China; [Gao, Meng] Chinese Acad Sci, Yantai Inst Coastal Zone Res, Yantai 264003, Peoples R China; [Wang, Wenting] Northwest Univ Nationalities, Sch Math, Lanzhou 730000, Gansu, Peoples R China; [Wang, Wenting] Northwest Univ Nationalities, Inst Comp Sci, Lanzhou 730000, Gansu, Peoples R China; [Liu, Zhiguang] Henan Univ, Sch Math & Informat Sci, Kaifeng 475001, Henan, Peoples R China |
| 中文摘要 | A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of external constraint on the evolution of cooperation. External constraint describes the case where individuals are forced to cooperate with a given probability in a society. Mathematical analyses are conducted via pair approximation and diffusion approximation methods. The results show that the condition for cooperation to be favored on graphs with constraint is (b) over bar/(c) over bar > k/(A) over bar ((A) over bar = 1 +kp/(1 - p)), where (b) over bar and (c) over bar represent the altruistic benefit and cost, respectively, k is the average degree of the graph and p is the probability of compulsory cooperation by external enforcement. Moreover, numerical simulations are also performed on a repeated game with three strategies, always defect (ALLD), tit-for-tat (TFT) and always cooperate (ALLC). These simulations demonstrate that a slight enforcement of ALLC can only promote cooperation when there is weak network reciprocity, while the catalyst effect of TFT on cooperation is verified. In addition, the interesting phenomenon of stable coexistence of the three strategies can be observed. Our model can represent evolutionary dynamics on a network structure which is disturbed by a specified external constraint. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. |
| 英文摘要 | A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of external constraint on the evolution of cooperation. External constraint describes the case where individuals are forced to cooperate with a given probability in a society. Mathematical analyses are conducted via pair approximation and diffusion approximation methods. The results show that the condition for cooperation to be favored on graphs with constraint is (b) over bar/(c) over bar > k/(A) over bar ((A) over bar = 1 +kp/(1 - p)), where (b) over bar and (c) over bar represent the altruistic benefit and cost, respectively, k is the average degree of the graph and p is the probability of compulsory cooperation by external enforcement. Moreover, numerical simulations are also performed on a repeated game with three strategies, always defect (ALLD), tit-for-tat (TFT) and always cooperate (ALLC). These simulations demonstrate that a slight enforcement of ALLC can only promote cooperation when there is weak network reciprocity, while the catalyst effect of TFT on cooperation is verified. In addition, the interesting phenomenon of stable coexistence of the three strategies can be observed. Our model can represent evolutionary dynamics on a network structure which is disturbed by a specified external constraint. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. |
| 学科主题 | Biology; Mathematical & Computational Biology |
| 研究领域[WOS] | Life Sciences & Biomedicine - Other Topics ; Mathematical & Computational Biology |
| 关键词[WOS] | STRUCTURED POPULATIONS ; DIRECT RECIPROCITY ; HETEROGENEOUS POPULATIONS ; SNOWDRIFT GAME ; COOPERATION ; DYNAMICS ; ALTRUISM ; LATTICE ; SELECTION ; BREAKING |
| 收录类别 | SCI |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000340336900011 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.yic.ac.cn/handle/133337/8596]  |
| 专题 | 烟台海岸带研究所_海岸带信息集成与综合管理实验室 |
| 作者单位 | 1.Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Nat & Appl Sci, Dept Appl Math, Xian 710027, Shaanxi, Peoples R China 2.Chinese Acad Sci, Yantai Inst Coastal Zone Res, Yantai 264003, Peoples R China 3.Northwest Univ Nationalities, Sch Math, Lanzhou 730000, Gansu, Peoples R China 4.Northwest Univ Nationalities, Inst Comp Sci, Lanzhou 730000, Gansu, Peoples R China 5.Henan Univ, Sch Math & Informat Sci, Kaifeng 475001, Henan, Peoples R China |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhang, Hui,Gao, Meng,Wang, Wenting,et al. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint[J]. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY,2014,358:122-131. |
| APA | Zhang, Hui,Gao, Meng,Wang, Wenting,&Liu, Zhiguang.(2014).Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint.JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY,358,122-131. |
| MLA | Zhang, Hui,et al."Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint".JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 358(2014):122-131. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：烟台海岸带研究所
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