中国科学院机构知识库网格
Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
Research on Retailer-driven Revenue-sharing Contracts Model under Manufacturers Competition

文献类型:会议论文

作者Zhou XM(周小明); Zhu YL(朱云龙); Guo HF(郭海峰)
出版日期2008
会议名称International Seminar on Business and Information Management (ISBIM 2008)
会议日期December 19-19, 2008
会议地点Wuhan, China
关键词Stackelberg game Supply chain with competing manufacturers Revenue-sharing Contract Coordination
页码79-83
中文摘要There is a universal meaning for studying the contract negotiations to improve the performance of the supply chain structure, which consists of competing multi-manufacturers and an independent and common retailer. Based on the characteristic that the retailer has stronger bargaining power, a Stackelberg game model where the retailer is a leader and the manufacturers are followers, was established. Then, Proofs for the game between manufacturers' production strategies existing a unique optimal symmetric nash equilibrium solution, and parameters' game on the revenue-sharing contracts existing a unique equilibrium solution, were provided. The relationship of decisions between decentralized and centralized supply chain under revenue-sharing contracts was discussed. The impacts of system parameters and products' substitutability level on the supply chain performance were further analyzed and verified through a simulation experiment at last.
收录类别EI ; CPCI(ISTP)
产权排序1
会议主办者Engn Technol Press, Intelligent Informat Technol Applicat Assoc, CPS, IEEE Comp Soc
会议录ISBIM: 2008 INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON BUSINESS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, VOL 2
会议录出版者IEEE COMPUTER SOC
会议录出版地LOS ALAMITOS
语种英语
ISBN号978-0-7695-3560-9
WOS记录号WOS:000269752000020
源URL[http://ir.sia.cn/handle/173321/8398]  
专题沈阳自动化研究所_工业信息学研究室
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Zhou XM,Zhu YL,Guo HF. Research on Retailer-driven Revenue-sharing Contracts Model under Manufacturers Competition[C]. 见:International Seminar on Business and Information Management (ISBIM 2008). Wuhan, China. December 19-19, 2008.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:沈阳自动化研究所

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