Research on Retailer-driven Revenue-sharing Contracts Model under Manufacturers Competition
文献类型:会议论文
作者 | Zhou XM(周小明); Zhu YL(朱云龙)![]() |
出版日期 | 2008 |
会议名称 | International Seminar on Business and Information Management (ISBIM 2008) |
会议日期 | December 19-19, 2008 |
会议地点 | Wuhan, China |
关键词 | Stackelberg game Supply chain with competing manufacturers Revenue-sharing Contract Coordination |
页码 | 79-83 |
中文摘要 | There is a universal meaning for studying the contract negotiations to improve the performance of the supply chain structure, which consists of competing multi-manufacturers and an independent and common retailer. Based on the characteristic that the retailer has stronger bargaining power, a Stackelberg game model where the retailer is a leader and the manufacturers are followers, was established. Then, Proofs for the game between manufacturers' production strategies existing a unique optimal symmetric nash equilibrium solution, and parameters' game on the revenue-sharing contracts existing a unique equilibrium solution, were provided. The relationship of decisions between decentralized and centralized supply chain under revenue-sharing contracts was discussed. The impacts of system parameters and products' substitutability level on the supply chain performance were further analyzed and verified through a simulation experiment at last. |
收录类别 | EI ; CPCI(ISTP) |
产权排序 | 1 |
会议主办者 | Engn Technol Press, Intelligent Informat Technol Applicat Assoc, CPS, IEEE Comp Soc |
会议录 | ISBIM: 2008 INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON BUSINESS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, VOL 2
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会议录出版者 | IEEE COMPUTER SOC |
会议录出版地 | LOS ALAMITOS |
语种 | 英语 |
ISBN号 | 978-0-7695-3560-9 |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000269752000020 |
源URL | [http://ir.sia.cn/handle/173321/8398] ![]() |
专题 | 沈阳自动化研究所_工业信息学研究室 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhou XM,Zhu YL,Guo HF. Research on Retailer-driven Revenue-sharing Contracts Model under Manufacturers Competition[C]. 见:International Seminar on Business and Information Management (ISBIM 2008). Wuhan, China. December 19-19, 2008. |
入库方式: OAI收割
来源:沈阳自动化研究所
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