中国科学院机构知识库网格
Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid
PMU Placement Protection against Coordinated False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid

文献类型:期刊论文

作者Pei C(裴超)2; Xiao Y(肖杨)1; Liang W(梁炜)2; Han XJ(韩晓佳)2
刊名IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications
出版日期2020
卷号56期号:4页码:4381-4393
关键词Cyber security cyber-physical system false data injection phase measurement units (PMUs) state estimation smart grid
ISSN号0093-9994
产权排序1
英文摘要

To maintain stable and reliable operations in smart grid, accurate state estimation is of paramount importance. However, synthesized false data injection attacks could wisely circumvent conventional bad data detection mechanisms by introducing arbitrary errors to state estimates to seriously affect the entire power system operation. To defend these attacks, phase measurement units (PMUs) are deployed in advance at various locations to reduce the chance of being attacked. However, when the budget of placement is not large enough so that the whole system cannot be covered by PMUs, the existing PMU placement algorithms based on greedy strategies are insufficient in some weak locations due to the nature of greedy strategies. In this article, we propose a new hybrid attack, which can be easily used by attackers to attack the buses with less connectivity and impose adverse impacts to state estimation with a low-attack cost so that existing defenses based on greedy strategies become invalid. We future propose a predeployment PMU greedy algorithm for this new attack in which the most vulnerable buses are first protected and, then, a greedy-based algorithm is used to deploy other PMUs until the whole system is observable. Experimental results on various IEEE standard systems demonstrate the effectiveness of our schemes.

WOS关键词STATE ESTIMATION ; NETWORKS ; SYSTEMS ; DEFENSE
资助项目National Natural Science Foundation of China[61673371] ; International Partnership Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences[173321KYSB20180020] ; Liaoning Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China[2019-YQ-09] ; China Scholarship Council
WOS研究方向Engineering
语种英语
WOS记录号WOS:000550744700102
资助机构National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61673371 ; International Partnership Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences under Grant 173321KYSB20180020 ; Liaoning Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 2019-YQ-09
源URL[http://ir.sia.cn/handle/173321/27474]  
专题沈阳自动化研究所_工业控制网络与系统研究室
通讯作者Xiao Y(肖杨); Liang W(梁炜)
作者单位1.Department of Computer Science, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0290, United States
2.State Key Laboratory of Robotics, Shenyang Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shenyang 110016, China;
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Pei C,Xiao Y,Liang W,et al. PMU Placement Protection against Coordinated False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid[J]. IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications,2020,56(4):4381-4393.
APA Pei C,Xiao Y,Liang W,&Han XJ.(2020).PMU Placement Protection against Coordinated False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid.IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications,56(4),4381-4393.
MLA Pei C,et al."PMU Placement Protection against Coordinated False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid".IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications 56.4(2020):4381-4393.

入库方式: OAI收割

来源:沈阳自动化研究所

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