Quality Evaluation Decision in outsourcing under Asymmetric Information
文献类型：会议论文
| 作者 | Zhang CH(张翠华); Yu HB(于海斌)
|
| 出版日期 | 2005 |
| 会议名称 | Fourth International Conference On Quality and Reliability |
| 会议日期 | August 9-11, 2005 |
| 会议地点 | Beijing, China |
| 关键词 | Outsourcing asymmetric information principal agent maximal principle quality evaluation quality prevention |
| 页码 | 333-338 |
| 通讯作者 | 张翠华 |
| 中文摘要 | Quality evaluation decision problem in outsourcing is studied under different information backgrounds. Based on the quality contracting optimization models in references[1,2], a principal agent model for quality prevention evaluation activities is set up with regards to buyer as a principal and supplier as an agent. In the models, quality prevention level is a supplier decision variable , quality evaluation level and transfer payment are buyer decision variables. Focus is on the study of quality evaluation level and transfer payment decision in outsourcing being turned into an optimal control problem under asymmetric information. Maximal principle is used to get the solution to quality evaluation when supplier prevention information is hidden. At last simulation calculation is done concerned with an agricultural machines company's tractor production outsourcing problem. Simulation results under different information backgrounds are analyzed and compared. |
| 收录类别 | CPCI（ISTP） |
| 产权排序 | 2 |
| 会议主办者 | Beijing Institute of Technology |
| 会议录 | Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference On Quality and Reliability
 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000233935000041 |
| 源URL | [http://ir.sia.cn/handle/173321/8115]  |
| 专题 | 沈阳自动化研究所_工业信息学研究室_工业控制系统研究室 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhang CH,Yu HB. Quality Evaluation Decision in outsourcing under Asymmetric Information[C]. 见:Fourth International Conference On Quality and Reliability. Beijing, China. August 9-11, 2005. |
入库方式： OAI收割
来源：沈阳自动化研究所
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